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ECONOMICS AND POLITICS:  PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE GOALS AND FUTURE OF ANTITRUST 
Jonathan B. Baker* 
 
This Article examines the roles of economics and politics in U.S. antitrust 
from several perspectives.  It explains why the modern debate over the 
economic welfare standard that enforcers and courts should pursue is 
unsatisfying.  It connects economics with politics by describing antitrust’s 
economic goals as the product of a mid-twentieth century political 
understanding about the nature of economic regulation that continues to be 
accepted.  To protect that understanding, it explains, antitrust rules should 
now be implemented using a qualified consumer welfare standard.  It 
identifies contemporary political tensions that threaten to create regulatory 
gridlock or even to undermine that political understanding and uses that 
framework to sketch several possible futures for competition policy. 
Notwithstanding these political tensions, the Article concludes, economics 
plays an indispensable role in shaping and applying modern antitrust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any modern antitrust practitioner would recognize the central role of 
economics in competition policy and case evaluation.  Yet any student of 
antitrust history would see politics too—–for example, the 1912 election 
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year debates that led to the enactment of the Clayton and FTC Acts,1 the 
congressional actions that prevented President Reagan’s Justice Department 
from arguing for the repeal of the per se rule against resale price 
maintenance,2 and presidential candidate George W. Bush’s skeptical 
comments about the Clinton Administration’s proposed remedy in its 
monopolization case against Microsoft.3 
This Article looks at the roles of economics and politics in U.S. antitrust 
from several perspectives.  The first section evaluates the modern debate 
over the economic welfare standard that enforcers and courts should pursue.  
The second section connects economics and politics by describing 
antitrust’s economic goals as the product of a mid-twentieth century 
political understanding about the nature of economic regulation that has 
continued in force to this day.  To protect that understanding, antitrust rules 
should now be implemented using a qualified consumer welfare standard.  
The third section identifies contemporary political tensions that threaten to 
create regulatory gridlock, or even to undermine the political understanding.  
The fourth section uses this framework to sketch several possible futures for 
competition policy.  The Article concludes with a comment on the 
indispensable role of economics in shaping and applying modern antitrust. 
I.  THE UNSATISFYING WELFARE STANDARD DEBATE 
I have always found the debate over antitrust’s goals unsatisfying.  The 
debate first took its modern form three decades ago as a dispute between 
Chicagoan Robert Bork and critic Robert Lande over antitrust’s origins.  At 
that time, the argument over economic goals was a proxy battle over 
whether antitrust should be reformed along Chicago school lines.4  
Chicagoan Robert Bork read the legislative history to defend an aggregate 
surplus goal, while critic Robert Lande read it to defend a consumer surplus 
goal.5 
 
 1. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy As a Political Bargain, 73 
ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 497–99 (2006); Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC:  
Concentration, Cooperation, Control and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003). 
 2. See Baker, supra note 1, at 509 n.96. 
 3. Mike Allen, Bush Hints He Would Not Have Prosecuted Microsoft, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 28. 2000, 12:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/feb00/28/
A43853-2000Feb28.html. 
 4. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 56–66 (1978), with Robert H. 
Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation:  Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide 
Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989), and Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).  Other prominent commentators writing around the same time 
defended noneconomic goals. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979). 
 5. The consumer surplus in a market equals the aggregate benefits (willingness to pay) 
that the buyers collectively receive, less the expenditures those buyers make.  The aggregate 
surplus equals the consumer benefits that buyers collectively receive less the variable costs 
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As an argument over antitrust’s origins, the debate foundered in part on 
the anachronism of interpreting the early understanding of the Sherman Act 
in terms of modern economic perspectives.  The best interpretation of the 
understanding of antitrust's original generation is neither Judge Bork’s nor 
Professor Lande’s. Rather, the Sherman Act was understood then as 
protecting natural rights to economic liberty, security of property, and the 
process of free and competitive exchange from artificial interference by 
private actors, much as the same generation saw the Constitution’s due 
process clause as protecting these rights from governmental interference.6  
Moreover, the dispute over antitrust’s origins is largely irrelevant to the 
goals of modern antitrust because the contemporary Supreme Court has 
accepted the Sherman Act’s “dynamic potential.”7 
Nor does it help clarify the dispute over goals to talk about them in 
economic terms.  The main difficulty is the absence of a clear way to use 
the economists’ Pareto efficiency standard when aggregating consumption 
bundles across individuals,8 or when analyzing the welfare consequences of 
business conduct in the partial equilibrium context in which antitrust cases 
 
of production expended by all the good’s sellers.  Aggregate surplus equals the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus.  The producer surplus equals the contribution to 
profit that sellers collectively receive from the market or, equivalently, the total payments 
sellers receive from buyers less the total variable costs of production. ANDREU MAS-COLELL, 
MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 332–33 (1995). 
 6. See generally James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:  Political and Economic 
Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989); cf. 
Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2012) 
(describing the 1911 Standard Oil antitrust decision as an application of Lochner to 
antitrust).  Viewed from this perspective, antitrust was originally understood as 
simultaneously promoting outcomes seen today as potentially in conflict, including 
individual business opportunity, economic efficiency, national prosperity, justice, social 
harmony, and personal freedom. 
 7. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman 
Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes the 
common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to 
the term in 1890.”); accord Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 888 (2007). 
 8. “The concept of Pareto optimality [or Pareto efficiency] offers a minimal and largely 
uncontroversial test that any social optimal economic outcome should pass.  An economic 
outcome is said to be Pareto optimal if it is impossible to make some individuals better off 
without making some other individuals worse off.  This concept is a formalization of the idea 
that there is no waste in society, and it conveniently separates the issue of economic 
efficiency from more controversial (and political) questions regarding the ideal distribution 
of well-being across individuals.” MAS-COLELL, supra note 5, at 307–08. But see Amartya 
Sen, The Impossibilty of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970) (demonsrating 
potential incompatibility between achieving Pareto efficiency and protecting individual 
rights).  The consumer surplus and aggregate surplus criteria commonly employed in 
economic discussions of antitrust goals aggregate across individuals.  Hence, it is not 
possible to tell whether an improvement in either surplus measure reflects a Pareto efficiency 
improvement without knowing whether those who gain compensate those who lose. 
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are evaluated.9  When framed in economic language, the argument over 
antitrust’s overarching goal is often described by commentators as a choice 
between a consumer surplus and an aggregate surplus standard.10  
Economic thinking does not provide a clear answer, only pros and cons.  
The consumer surplus approach has the advantage of looking solely to 
consumers, the actors who are the sole concern of the Pareto criterion.  The 
aggregate surplus approach has the advantage of also accounting for 
production efficiencies that would often ultimately accrue to other 
consumers in other markets, but it could justify conduct that makes most or 
all of the consumers of the product in question worse off.11  Courts and 
enforcers are generally wary of tolerating conduct that harms (or is likely to 
harm) a class of consumers, so in practice they tend to act consistently with 
the consumer surplus standard.12 
Moreover, it can be difficult to apply an economic welfare standard—
whether consumer surplus or aggregate surplus—when accounting for 
enforcement institutions, for four reasons.  First, those institutions impose 
transaction costs and can make mistakes.13  Second, courts and enforcers 
 
 9. A “partial equilibrium” is the outcome that arises in a single market, without 
reference to the production and consumption of any other goods in the economy.  Consumer 
surplus and aggregate surplus are defined for a single market in partial equilibrium.  
Problems associated with a partial equilibrium analysis may include accounting for “second 
best” issues that arise when other markets are not competitive, and accounting for income 
effects.  In applying either surplus standard, it may also be difficult to discount future effects 
appropriately if harms or efficiencies are delayed or to account for the effects of antitrust 
policy on innovation and investment. See generally Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust 
Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2010) (distinguishing 
between the surplus analysis commonly used to evaluate antitrust issues and welfare analysis 
in economic theory); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  The 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (framing the welfare standard issue in 
economic terms). 
 10. Practices that maximize aggregate surplus do not necessarily maximize consumer 
surplus, and vice versa. See Baker, supra note 1, at 516–18; Steven C. Salop, Question:  
What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?  Answer:  The True Consumer 
Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2009). But cf. Terry Calvani, Rectangles 
& Triangles:  A Response to Mr. Lande, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 657 (1989) (conduct with 
collusive anticompetitive effects often harms competition under either measure). 
 11. A robust tax and transfer system could prevent consumer losses. See LOUIS KAPLOW 
& STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY 29–38 (2002).  But with respect to the 
consumer harm from antitrust violations, that is more a theoretical possibility than a practical 
corrective. See Salop, supra note 10, at 350–51. 
 12. Salop, supra note 10, at 339; Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s 
Welfare Goals 7 (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 12-39, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154499; see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, ‘Obvious’ 
Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy:  The Chicago School, the Post–Chicago School and the 
Courts, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 129 (Antonio Cucinotta, 
Roberto Pardolesi & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 2002). 
 13. The Harvard school’s focus on the administrability of antitrust rules treats 
transaction costs as a first-order problem. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual 
DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct:  The Chicago/Harvard 
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may be at an information disadvantage relative to firms.  Under such 
circumstances, the best way for antitrust institutions to pursue either welfare 
goal may be to do so indirectly.  In some settings, for example, a 
commitment to a consumer welfare approach will maximize aggregate 
welfare.14  Third, if legal rules are designed to pursue a particular goal, their 
design must account for error costs, understood broadly to include 
deterrence.15  But the error costs of any particular substantive antitrust rule 
depend on other rules of antitrust law and beyond, such as procedural rules 
governing litigation, rules about remedy determination, the scope of 
intellectual property rights, and whether state unfair competition laws cover 
the same conduct.16  Fourth, it can be particularly challenging to evaluate 
the welfare consequences of practices that benefit consumers in the short 
run but may harm them in the long run, as with predatory pricing.  With 
these four complications added to the initial difficulty of choosing between 
consumer surplus and total welfare, it is hard to be confident that any 
particular legal rule will minimize error costs for any of the issues antitrust 
commentators argue about, like bundled discounts or the unilateral 
competitive effects of mergers, even with the best of intentions.17 
 
Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2007).  The problem of evaluating efficiency 
claims in merger analysis provides an example.  Judge Posner has described doing so as “a 
matter of speculation flavored by hope.” RICHARD A POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 133 (2d ed. 
2001).  Antitrust enforcement has not accepted Posner’s view, for example, see U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010) 
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf, but if Posner is correct, courts are less likely to make 
mistakes when applying a consumer welfare standard than an aggregate surplus standard, as 
the consumer surplus criterion avoids the need to analyze fixed cost savings. 
 14. See David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and Antitrust Policy, 9 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1993); Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger Remedies:  Some 
Problems, in MERGER REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 95–105 
(Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2003); Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik 
Roller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger 
Control, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 829 (2005); Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus 
Defense in Merger Control (IFN, Working Paper No. 686, 2007). 
 15. Error costs are the costs of false positives and false negatives, not just in the 
individual matters under review but also in potentially chilling procompetitive conduct or 
failing to deter anticompetitive conduct in the future, in the same or other markets.  False 
positives and false negatives may not neatly map to overdeterrence and underdeterrence, 
respectively, because the deterrence consequences of legal errors depend in part on the way 
the errors affect the marginal costs and benefits to firms of taking precautions to avoid 
violations. See generally Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1029–40 (Boudewijn Bouchaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
 16. See generally Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012); Abraham 
L. Wickelgren, Determining the Optimal Antitrust Standard:  How To Think About Per Se 
Versus Rule of Reason, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. (POSTSCRIPT) 52, 54 (2012), http://weblaw.
usc.edu/why/students/orgs/lawreview/documents/85SCalLRevPS_85Wickelgren.pdf. 
 17. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 11 (describing the difficulties with evaluating the 
welfare consequences of tying and resale price maintenance); Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion 
As a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (2013) (discussing alternative views 
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For these reasons, it is no surprise that after decades of doctrinal 
elaboration under an economic approach, the antitrust community has not 
reached a durable consensus over the economic goal that antitrust 
enforcement should pursue.  Indeed, it is unlikely that the community will 
ever identify a precise objective function that the antitrust laws should or do 
maximize, or that any approach to defining antitrust’s goals can supply the 
precision, clarity, and certainty that the open-ended Sherman Act does not 
provide.18  Judges are not asked to specify or apply legal rules in order to 
advance a unitary goal in other legal fields.  Unless antitrust is special, the 
antitrust community’s pursuit of a unitary goal is asking too much. 
This Article is not suggesting that economic analysis should take a back 
seat to noneconomic concerns.  In fact, the next section explains why 
antitrust in the modern era has always had a generalized economic goal, 
even during the Warren Court era when social and political concerns 
counted for more than they do now.  It is also not suggesting that antitrust 
enforcers and courts should decide cases arbitrarily.  The next section will 
also explain why the antitrust rules today should be implemented through a 
qualified consumer welfare standard.  The point here is narrow:  we should 
not talk about the antitrust field as though we just have to settle one pesky 
detail—whether to select aggregate surplus or consumer surplus as the 
appropriate goal—in order to reach the end of antitrust history. 
II.  ANTITRUST THROUGH THE LENS OF A POLITICAL BARGAIN 
Our conversation about the goals of antitrust is unusual when compared 
with the way legal scholars talk about other fields.  My sense, which I will 
sketch but not defend in detail, is that two sweeping intellectual projects 
animate much of contemporary legal scholarship,19 rooted in different 
conceptions of the public good.20  When antitrust discourse is located 
 
over the application of error cost analysis to the evaluation of rules governing exclusionary 
conduct); cf. Memorandum from Jonathan B. Baker & M. Howard Morse, Final Report of 
Economic Evidence Task Force to Officers and Council (Aug. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-reports/01-c-ii.pdf (describing the difficulties facing 
generalist judges in evaluating economic evidence). 
 18. The Sherman Act describes prohibited conduct in extremely general terms.  Sherman 
Act section 1 forbids agreements “in restraint of trade” and Sherman Act section 2 forbids 
conduct that “monopolize[s]” or “attempt[s] to monopolize.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). 
 19. I emphasize these two projects because they are important to legal scholarship and 
provide helpful context for thinking about antitrust, but I do not contend that they encompass 
every important academic school of thought.  Indeed, surveys of modern U.S. jurisprudence 
commonly identify multiple schools. See, e.g., THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 7 
(David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006) (identifying eight schools:  Legal 
Realism, Legal Process, Law and Economics, Law and Society, Critical Legal Studies, 
Modern Liberalism, Feminist Legal Thought, and Critical Race Theory). 
 20. In some deep sense, both projects seek to ensure that the law and the market fulfill 
their common promise of harnessing private incentives to advance the public good.  But they 
differ in focus:  the first emphasizes the contribution of political and economic rights to that 
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within this framework, the idea that antitrust must be about maximizing 
either consumer surplus or aggregate surplus seems even less appealing.21 
In broad strokes, the first project is concerned with encouraging 
democratic participation and seeking social justice.22  This project 
celebrates, for example, the expansion of the franchise, the inclusion of 
minority groups into mainstream life, the assurance of economic security 
for the less fortunate, and the recognition and protection of civil rights.23  
The second project is concerned with creating social wealth, improving 
living standards, capturing efficiencies and fostering economic growth.  
This project predated the law and economics movement, but that scholarly 
approach has made the second project more important in legal academia.24 
 
good, while the second emphasizes the contribution of economic efficiency and economic 
growth. 
 21. Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 363 (1995) (“While 
Chicago may have dominated the struggle for the soul of antitrust, it is a struggle which 
seems destined to continue.”). 
 22. E.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS 
D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:  ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 195 (1993) 
(describing liberalism, in its various forms, as the dominant perspective in constitutional 
theory for much of the second half of the twentieth century). 
 23. This is mainly a progressive project, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996), though it has a conservative variant that contests which rights are 
primary and emphasizes securing economic rights to property and freedom of contract. E.g., 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); cf. Justin Desautels-
Stein, The Market As a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387 (2012) (distinguishing the 
classical/neoliberal view of the market and state, which emphasizes the role of background 
law in creating markets, from modern liberalism, which also charges the state with using law 
to address market failures, and critiquing both).  I think of Critical Legal Studies as a variant 
that emphasizes the malleability of the law and argues that as a result, legal rules tend to 
serve the powerful.  If so, progressive legal victories are reversible, so constant political 
mobilization by the less powerful is needed to protect and extend any gains they make.  This 
voice has rarely been heard in modern antitrust scholarship. But cf. Richard Brunell, 
Appropriability in Antitrust:  How Much Is Enough?, 9 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2001) (arguing 
that the indeterminacy of appropriability arguments in antitrust limits the usefulness of 
economics as a guide for antitrust policy); Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the 
Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 465 (1998) (highlighting distributional implications of mainstream law and 
economics thought generally); Justin Desautels-Stein, Liberal Legalism and the Two State 
Action Doctrines, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author) (arguing 
that the antitrust state action doctrine and the constitutional state action doctrine share a 
liberal conception of the role of law in governing markets). 
 24. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); cf. 
William E. Nelson, Horwitz and the Direction of Legal Thought, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 500, 501 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010) 
(“Law and economics scholars claim the ability in a wide range of fields to bring about . . .  
Pareto improvements in doctrine, and it is not surprising that they are rapidly colonizing 
those fields.”). 
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Before the 1980s, antitrust might have appeared to bridge both projects.  
During antitrust’s structural era,25 courts and commentators talked about 
themes that sound like democratic participation, such as ensuring all 
producers a fair opportunity to compete, preventing the exploitation of 
consumers and farmers, and limiting the political power of large firms.26  
But antitrust discourse then was also concerned with allowing firms to 
obtain production efficiencies and promoting economic growth.27 
Antitrust’s Chicago school revolution discarded talk of social and 
political goals and reframed antitrust to focus solely on economic concerns.  
But that observation does not mean that antitrust was part of both projects 
during the structural era and only part of the economic growth project since 
that time.  Rather, the social and political concerns that formed part of the 
antitrust conversation during the earlier period were instrumental, not 
essential.  Since the New Deal, as I will explain, antitrust has always been 
about the second project:  about capturing economic efficiencies by 
adopting competition policy in preference to either less regulatory or more 
regulatory approaches that were also live options in the early twentieth 
century political debate about dealing with large firms. 
The argument for this claim is in previous work in which I interpret 
competition policy, broadly defined, as a political choice made at the end of 
the New Deal for dealing with the growth of large firms in an industrial 
economy.28  That choice resolved a central political concern of U.S. politics 
during the late nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth 
 
 25. I demarcate three major eras of antitrust interpretation:  classical (1890 to the 1940s), 
structural (1940s through the 1970s), and Chicago school (since the late 1970s). Jonathan B. 
Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 60–67. 
 26. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 54–56 (1978) (criticizing political concerns 
recognized by the then-current case law); William H. Page, The Ideological Origins and 
Evolution of U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1, 7–10 
(Wayne Dale Collins et. al. eds., 2008) (describing populist concerns characterizing antitrust 
from the New Deal through the Warren Court); Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1052–60 (favoring 
some commonly cited social and political goals while opposing others).  When Justice 
Thurgood Marshall described the antitrust laws as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and 
“as important to the preservation of economic freedom . . . as the Bill of Rights is to the 
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms,” he no doubt had in mind these types of 
concerns. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“charter of economic liberty”); United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (“charter of freedom”); Appalachian 
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (same). 
 27. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:  AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 13–14 (1959) (“To sum up, efficiency and progressiveness [productivity growth 
and innovation] are the most important economic results whose achievement can be 
substantially influenced by antitrust policy.”). 
 28. See generally Baker, supra note 1; Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political 
Bargain:  The Political Economy of the Non-interventionist Challenge to Monopolization 
Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605 (2010). 
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century.  The U.S. political system could have adopted a more 
interventionist regulatory approach involving industrial policy and direct 
regulation. Although many sectors of the economy, including 
communications, energy, financial services, and transportation were heavily 
regulated—often with prices set by regulators—in most of the economy, 
firms were generally allowed to compete.  The United States could have 
also adopted a less interventionist self-regulatory or laissez-faire approach, 
relying on private enterprise to organize production and trade with little or 
no supervision to ensure that firms competed.  These were both seriously 
debated alternatives with decades of strong political backing.29  Instead, the 
United States adopted competition policy as the primary approach to 
economic regulation, in order to reach a generalized economic goal of 
obtaining and sharing the efficiency benefits of competition.  I call that 
informal understanding a “political bargain.”30  This understanding 
accounts for the depoliticization of antitrust since the 1940s, thus providing 
an answer to the question historian Richard Hofstadter asked in 1964:  
“What Ever Happened to the Antitrust Movement?”31  In addition, this 
framework highlights the important role of antitrust institutions in 
implementing an economic regulatory policy framed around competition, 
though other institutions, including sector regulators, also play a role. 
The political bargain adopted competition policy in preference to 
regulation or laissez-faire, but it did not freeze antitrust rules.  When the 
bargain was reached, the main theme of antitrust was to ensure close 
scrutiny of large firms in concentrated markets.  The major changes in 
antitrust dating around 1980, associated with the rise of the Chicago school, 
reformed the bargain in order to increase the efficiency benefits of 
competition, primarily by removing impediments to achieving production 
efficiencies. 
On this account, antitrust policy since the New Deal has always had an 
economic goal.  The social and political concerns that antitrust discarded 
when the rules were reformed had been instrumental:  useful touchstones 
for ensuring political support, but not essential to antitrust.  Since the mid-
twentieth century, antitrust has fundamentally been about capturing 
economic efficiencies by adopting a policy that favors competition over 
either less regulatory or more regulatory approaches, but antitrust policy 
 
 29. Baker, supra note 1, at 497–503; see Winerman, supra note 1, at 15–43 (describing 
positions held by Roosevelt, Taft, Brandeis, and Wilson in the debate leading to the 
enactment of the FTC and Clayton Acts). 
 30. The political economy argument offered to support this perspective interprets 
political outcomes in terms of interest group competition but does not assume that a welfare-
enhancing policy such as this one is the inevitable product of Coasian bargaining among 
conflicting interest groups or the product of evolutionary selection. Baker, supra note 1, at 
485–93.  The welfare-enhancing policy instead arises as an equilibrium made feasible by the 
repeated noncooperative political interaction of two interest group coalitions. Id. at 524–30. 
 31. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID 
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965). 
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does not bend every aspect toward economic efficiency because it must 
protect its political support.32 
In this story, the political bargain constrains the antitrust rules as a whole, 
but it does not constrain the rules individually.33  The institutions that foster 
and protect competition will preserve their political support so long as 
enough of the benefits go to the two diffuse interest groups that reached the 
informal understanding:  consumers, farmers, and small business on the one 
hand, and large firms on the other.  The bargain will persist so long as 
neither group thinks it can do better by giving up on it and mobilizing 
politically to seek a different policy.  The resulting bounds have left a great 
deal of room within which the courts can maneuver, particularly in 
specifying the details of antitrust doctrine. 
From this perspective, antitrust rules capture efficiencies, but their 
distributional consequences are important because competition policy needs 
to maintain political support.  The rule changes prompted by Chicago 
school arguments likely increased aggregate welfare by addressing a 
concern that the earlier rules were chilling production efficiencies.  But the 
Chicago-oriented rule modifications likely also tended to redistribute 
surplus from consumers to large firms by increasing the risk that firms will 
exercise market power. 
To see this distributional point, compare the structural era antitrust rules, 
established from the 1940s to the mid-1970s, with the more recent 
approach.  Before Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
Systems, Inc.,34 the per se rule against horizontal restraints was not limited 
to naked restraints.  Before Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp,35 it was easier to survive summary judgment when inferring an 
agreement from circumstantial evidence.  During antitrust’s structural era, 
horizontal mergers were strongly presumed to harm competition.36  Before 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,37 some non-price vertical 
restraints were illegal per se, and before Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,38 resale price maintenance was often illegal per se.39  
 
 32. This frame offers a way to discuss the role of politics in shaping antitrust that is 
rooted in the interest group competition approach of positive political theory and recognizes 
the centrality of economics to antitrust analysis. 
 33. Individual case outcomes may depend on a mix of substantive and procedural rules. 
Cf. Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions To Dismiss, and Other Examples of 
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. LJ. 1065 (1986) (showing how the 
antitrust treble damages remedy has shaped substantive and procedural antitrust law across 
doctrinal categories). 
 34. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 35. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 37. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 38. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 39. Between the 1950s and mid-1970s, however, Congress gave states the authority to 
permit resale price maintenance agreements in certain industries, and during the 1980s the 
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The United States v. Aluminum Company of America40 court found 
monopolization from conduct unlikely to be considered sufficient today:  a 
dominant firm’s expansion of capacity in advance of demand.41  Predatory 
pricing was accepted as a possible anticompetitive strategy during the 
structural era, and rivals were viewed as appropriate parties to vindicate 
antitrust principles as private attorneys general, but these views are more 
controversial today.42 
The old rules each likely deterred more anticompetitive conduct than the 
corresponding modern rules do now.  But in general, the rules were 
modified for a good reason:  they chilled cost reductions and other 
efficiency-enhancing conduct.43  The rule modifications addressed that 
problem by reducing the risk of false convictions.  In accomplishing that 
end, they systematically accepted a greater risk of false acquittals.  As a 
result, the risk that firms would exercise market power has likely 
increased.44  Continued rule modifications in the same vein, toward the 
noninterventionist side of competition policy disputes, would also increase 
the risk that exploited consumers would give up on the political bargain by 
 
Supreme Court narrowed the application of the per se rule by elevating standards of proof. 
See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE:  CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 358, 371–74 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 40. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 41. Compare id., with E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980). 
 42. See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing after Brooke Group:  An Economic 
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994) (describing Chicago school criticisms of 
predatory pricing theories); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust 
Laws:  The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1991) (contending that few lawsuits 
brought by rivals appeared meritorious). 
 43. The Chicago school’s critics have conceded this point. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 
§ 1.3, at 7 (2000) (“By the mid-1970s, a sense that some court decisions had suppressed 
conduct that was efficient and the contemporaneous growth in influence of the Chicago 
School of Economics began tempering enforcement policy.”); Robert Pitofsky, Does 
Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321, 323–25 (1987) (finding “much wrong with the 
overly aggressive antitrust enforcement policies of the 1960s” and commending the Supreme 
Court for moving “cautiously and thoughtfully in the direction of more lenient antitrust 
policies” since the mid-1970s through decisions that were “generally more solicitous toward 
claims of efficiency”); cf. Thomas E. Kauper, Influence of Conservative Economic Analysis 
on the Development of the Law of Antitrust, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE 
MARK:  THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 40, 42–44 
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (while Chicago criticisms of the antitrust doctrines of the 1950s 
and 1960s were influential in bringing about change, those doctrines were often easy targets 
for ridicule and were also criticized by a number of influential non-Chicagoans, such as 
Phillip Areeda, Donald Turner, and Robert Pitofsky). 
 44. There is no reason to think that, as a group, these modifications to antitrust’s rules 
simultaneously relaxed average deterrence but increased marginal deterrence, 
notwithstanding the theoretical possibility discussed supra note 15.  
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mobilizing politically to replace an economic policy based on preferring 
competition with more direct regulation.45 
After more than three decades during which antitrust rules were reworked 
to prevent them from chilling the pursuit of production efficiencies, the risk 
that the antitrust rules will permit large firms to exploit their market power 
to such a great extent that those rules will lose the support of the consumer 
coalition has increased.  Today, this risk is substantially more serious than 
the opposite possibility, that the antitrust laws would be used to redistribute 
producer surplus to consumers and lead large firms to see no benefit from 
maintaining the bargain.  For that reason, antitrust rules should now be 
implemented with reference to a qualified consumer welfare standard:  
antitrust institutions should adopt a consumer surplus standard in general, 
but allow firms to capture increased producer surplus if those gains are 
large and the lost consumer surplus is small.46  This is roughly how fixed 
cost savings from mergers are treated in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines.47  In practice, therefore, enforcers should target conduct that 
harms consumers, allowing efficiencies to trump consumer harm only in 
exceptional cases, and courts should similarly frame rules and decide cases 
to prevent consumer harm. 
III.  THE END OF DEREGULATION 
To think about antitrust’s possible futures, it is useful to broaden the lens 
and examine how economic regulatory policy has developed since the mid-
twentieth century within the informal political understanding I identified 
and to locate antitrust developments within this larger context.  As 
competition policy is viewed within a wider frame of economic regulation, 
the political understanding must be described more broadly:  as an informal 
mid-twentieth century social contract that combines social insurance with 
competition policy. 
 
 45. Progressive commentators writing today have expressed concern about the exercise 
of market power in large sectors of the economy. See, e.g., SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE 
AUDIENCE:  THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GUILDED AGE 
(2013); BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED:  THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS 
OF DESTRUCTION (2010); cf. Margaret C. Levenstein, Antitrust and Business History, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 451 (2012) (explaining that competition policy may unduly favor large 
firms).  The contemporary progressive concern with social problems arising from increased 
inequality could also bring more political attention to the distributional consequences of 
antitrust rules.  However, the most sustained and influential recent political mobilization has 
been conservative, from the Tea Party, not progressive. 
 46. Baker, supra note 1, at 521–22.  This standard would not be met if the efficiencies 
could practically be obtained in some other way that presents less harm to consumers.  
Although a qualified consumer welfare standard makes sense today, under different 
circumstances I might argue instead for more emphasis on producer surplus, as by shifting to 
an aggregate welfare standard. 
 47. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 10. 
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I think of social insurance as related to competition policy politically.  
From this perspective,48 social insurance is a type of “side payment”—a 
way of sweetening the deal to induce political acceptance of a policy 
fostering competitive markets among consumers, farmers, workers, and 
their families.  In general, consumers, farmers, and workers have difficulty 
insuring against the risks they have been asked to bear in a dynamic 
economy.  These risks include unemployment and skill obsolescence.  They 
also include the fraying of extended family networks that could otherwise 
help people spread income over their lifecycle, share in the costs of caring 
for retirees and children, and share healthcare costs.  Competitive markets 
exacerbate these risks.  Social insurance has historically been the most 
practical and cost-effective way to allocate such risks efficiently.49 
Although I have described the political bargain as an arrangement 
reached by two diffuse interest groups, I interpret policy outcomes achieved 
within the political bargain as the product of an interest group competition 
mediated by ideology.50  I will therefore describe economic regulatory 
policy since the mid-twentieth century as arising from a political 
competition among centrists, noninterventionists on their right, and 
interventionists on their left.  From this broader perspective, the centrist 
position endorses both parts of the informal mid-twentieth century 
understanding:  competition policy for dealing with large firms and social 
insurance to provide a safety net.51  Conservative noninterventionists would 
prefer to rely more on self-regulation for the economy and more on private 
insurance to address risks, while progressive interventionists would prefer 
to rely more on direct regulation and the direct provision of social services 
like health care. 
 
 48. Social insurance also has other justifications, on grounds of efficiency (lowering the 
transaction costs of risk bearing) and equity.  Social insurance may be implemented directly 
through government-run insurance programs or indirectly through tax policy. 
 49. But cf. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER:  RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2003) (proposing financial instruments to lower the transaction costs of obtaining private 
insurance against various social risks); ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS:  CREATING 
INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS (1993) (same). 
 50. Ideology helps solve an agency problem governing the relationship between interest 
group members (principals) and political leaders (agents).  By committing to an ideological 
perspective, a political leader can signal to interest group members that when circumstances 
change or unanticipated issues arise after election, the leader will act consistent with the 
group’s interests.  In consequence, interest group members select leaders, at least, in part 
based on their ideological commitments.  Doing so also facilitates monitoring of the leader’s 
decisions by interest group members, as it may be easier to determine whether specific 
decisions by elected officials are consistent with an ideological perspective than to determine 
whether those decisions directly benefit the interest group’s members. 
 51. When Governor Romney, the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential election, 
expressed sympathy for government health insurance programs in his first debate with 
President Obama, commentators described his views as moving toward the center. See, e.g., 
Doyle McManus, Moderate Mitt?  Don’t Count On It, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, at A28. 
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The centrist approach to economic regulatory policy has been 
implemented since the New Deal, with a major change of emphasis along 
the way.  For the first few decades, centrists partnered mainly with 
progressives on regulatory matters.  For example, Medicare, a major safety 
net expansion, was enacted over the opposition of conservatives, who 
viewed it as inappropriate government intervention into the marketplace.52  
During the Carter Administration, Senator Edward Kennedy and his 
committee counsel, future Justice Stephen Breyer, brought conservatives 
into the tent.  The right found common ground with the center/left coalition 
in enacting airline deregulation.53  But the centrists later switched dancing 
partners when the left grew disenchanted with regulatory reform. 
Since the Reagan Administration, accordingly, centrists have gotten their 
way on regulatory policy by collaborating with conservatives.  Deregulation 
became a center/right program.54  It was wide-ranging across the 
transportation, communications, energy, and financial services sectors.55  
The regulatory reforms were centrist rather than conservative because they 
preserved regulation where competition would be insufficient.  For 
example, rate regulation remains for the transmission and retail distribution 
of electricity.56  Communications deregulation did not allow local phone 
companies to provide long distance service until the long distance market 
became competitive.57  Congress reversed cable deregulation in 1992 after 
eight years in which hoped-for competition did not appear, then refined its 
regulatory scheme four years later.58  Airline deregulation left safety 
 
 52. Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1095, 1099 (2003). 
 53. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 122–23 
(1985) (the political coalition favoring airline and trucking deregulation “covered most of the 
political spectrum,” thereby demonstrating “the degree to which widely shared interests and 
values converged in support of reform”); Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION 75, 120 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (airline deregulation 
legislation passed Congress almost unanimously). 
 54. See MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE MARKETS:  THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL 
ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, & THE UNITED STATES 62–82 (2006) 
(deregulation was viewed as proconsumer (liberal) during the early 1970s, in the national 
interest during the mid-1980s, and probusiness (conservative) in the late 1970s). 
 55. See generally Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation:  Days of Reckoning for 
Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1263 (1993). 
 56. See STAFF REPORT, FTC, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES 
ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
be/v000009.shtm.  Similarly, rail deregulation did not eliminate the power to regulate 
shipping rates of dominant rail carriers. See James Calderwood, Legal Briefs:  Should Rail 
Rates Be Regulated Again?, MH&L NEWS (Apr. 4, 2006), http://mhlnews.com/
transportation-amp-distribution/legal-briefs-should-rail-rates-be-regulated-again. 
 57. JONATHAN E. NEUCHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:  AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 88 (2005). 
 58. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 456–57 
(3d ed. 2012). 
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regulation in the hands of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), not 
relying solely on marketplace incentives to keep planes from falling out of 
the sky.59 
Deregulation has, on the whole, been a success, particularly for 
consumers.60  Financial deregulation was a partial exception, as is evident 
from the costly problems with savings and loans during the 1980s61 and 
with nonbank financial institutions and markets more recently.62  These 
problems arose in part because centrists misjudged the need for residual 
government supervision.  In consequence, financial regulators were not led 
to approach their task the way the FAA supervises airline safety. 
I understand the shift in the coalition that controlled economic regulatory 
policy—moving from center/left to center/right—as the product of two 
main factors.  In part, it was a reaction to a difficult economic environment.  
The decade of economic stagnation that began during the 1970s included 
two oil shocks, inflation, three recessions, a productivity slowdown, 
sluggish income growth for workers, and increased foreign competition for 
domestic industries.63  The shifting coalition was also a reaction to the 
increased federal role in economic life, which resulted particularly from 
legislation protecting civil rights, the environment, and worker safety.64  
These factors combined to favor a regulatory reform agenda aimed at 
increasing productivity by attacking excessive regulation, including both 
deregulation and reforms of the antitrust laws.  That agenda was 
implemented within the political bargain, not by rejecting it. 
 
 59. See generally TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WINDS OF 
CHANGE:  DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT SINCE DEREGULATION 169–98 (1991). 
 60. See generally MAS-COLELL, supra note 5. 
 61. See generally LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE:  PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 
FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991). 
 62. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis:  A 
One-Weekend-Reader’s Guide, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 128, 132 (2012) (at the time of the 
2008 financial crisis, the “main vulnerability” of the “shadow banking system” to the 
equivalent of a bank run was in financial markets for short term debt, mostly repurchase 
agreements and commercial paper, which were both large and unregulated); Andrew W. Lo, 
Reading About the Financial Crisis:  A Twenty-One Book Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
151, 157–58 (2012) (recounting the view that a lack of transparency in markets for 
securitized debt led to a collapse in trading in structured investment vehicles and a stall in 
the markets for repurchase agreements); id. at 161 (recounting the view that after financial 
industry regulation was dismantled, “too big to fail” financial institutions took excessive 
risks); id. at 162–63 (recounting the view that financial deregulation and regulatory capture 
permitted industry concentration and facilitated financial innovation, making the financial 
system prone to recurrent crises). 
 63. See LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING:  A NEW POLITICS, 1974–1980, at 38–63 
(2010); Alan S. Blinder & Jeremy B. Rudd, The Supply-Shock Explanation of the Great 
Stagflation Revisited, in THE GREAT INFLATION:  THE REBIRTH OF MODERN CENTRAL 
BANKING (Michael D. Bordo & Athanasios Orphanidees eds., 2013). 
 64. See KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS:  THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN 185–225 (2009). 
 2190 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Although the centrist approach to economic regulation has been accepted 
for decades, it is now under pressure.  Today, remarkably, we see a 
simultaneous discontent with the centrist approach from both sides, the 
right as well as the left.  On the right, conservative senators held up 
confirmation of the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
in a bid to water down the agency’s powers and independence, forcing the 
White House to make a recess appointment.65  The House of 
Representatives, under the sway of conservatives, sought to overrule the 
Federal Communications Commission’s open internet rules on net 
neutrality, although they were thwarted by the Senate.66  In 2003, during the 
Bush Administration, competition-oriented centrists worked with 
compassionate conservatives to add a prescription drug benefit to 
Medicare.67  But when the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) was enacted 
in 2010, conservatives walked away from market-based reforms that their 
camp had previously endorsed,68 and during 2012, the entire Republican 
presidential field called for the Act’s repeal.69  On the left, the Occupy Wall 
Street movement criticized the Dodd-Frank financial reforms as too little, 
too late.70  Progressives did not embrace the 2003 prescription drug benefit, 
on the grounds that it was an expensive handout to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and that its reliance on insurance companies was the first 
step toward privatizing Medicare.71  Progressive support for the 2010 health 
care law was muted, just sufficient for congressional enactment, because 
progressives preferred a government-run system like Medicare to the 
Affordable Care Act’s competition-based approach.72 
 
 65. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer 
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at A1. 
 66. Peter Voskamp, GOP Attempt To Overturn FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules Fails in 
Senate, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/idUS211
494328220111110. 
 67. See Oberlander, supra note 52, at 1133–36; Christine Hauser, President Signs 
Medicare Bill Adding Prescription Drug Benefit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/08/politics/08CND-BUSH.html. 
 68. Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2012), http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/120625fa_fact_klein. 
 69. Nellie Bristol, Republican Presidential Candidates United on Healthcare, 379 
LANCET 107 (2012). 
 70. Matt Stoller, The False Dodd-Frank Narrative:  Occupy Wall Street Attacks Huge 
Hot Money Loophole in the Law, NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 6, 2012, 1:43 PM), 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/11/the-false-dodd-frank-narrative-occupy-wall-street-
attacks-huge-hot-money-loophole-in-the-law.html. 
 71. See Reihan Salam, Brief Note on Paul Ryan and the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Benefit, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 12, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/
agenda/313766/brief-note-paul-ryan-and-medicare-prescription-drug-benefit-reihan-salam#. 
 72. See Theda Skocpol, Naming the Problem:  What It Will Take To Counter Extremism 
and Engage Americans in the Fight Against Global Warning, SCHOLARS STRATEGY 
NETWORK, 39–44 (Jan. 2013), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/
skocpol_captrade_report_january_2013_0.pdf; David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Final 
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Every regulation has its critics, but the current turmoil is surprising 
because the Obama Administration has followed the same centrist playbook 
for economic regulation that has succeeded since the Reagan 
Administration.  The standard playbook is failing because the center/right 
coalition has broken down.  Conservative opponents of “big government” 
no longer seem willing to compromise with centrists.  Moreover, the 
center/right coalition may have run its natural course, as its core program 
has largely become obsolete.  After decades of regulatory reform, additional 
deregulation now risks removing regulatory supervision in industries where 
doing so would allow the exercise of market power, create other market 
failures, or undermine the safety net.  More deregulation now would tend to 
advance a noninterventionist agenda while impeding centrist goals, not by 
enhancing competition and social insurance.73 
Antitrust policy illustrates the current tensions in the center/right 
coalition.  During the 1980s, even Robert Pitofsky, a leading liberal 
antitrust voice, accepted the need for reform.74  But today the Chicago 
school’s program, like deregulation generally, is largely complete.  A few 
years ago, Judge Douglas Ginsburg described the rule against tying as the 
“last man standing,”75 indicating how far the Chicago-oriented reformation 
of antitrust rules has come. 
In recent years, antitrust conservatives have been advancing a 
noninterventionist program that does not appear to seek compromise with 
centrists.  I have in mind the section 2 report from the Justice Department 
during the George W. Bush Administration,76 which the Federal Trade 
Commission pointedly refused to join and the Obama Administration 
withdrew.77  I am also thinking of Justice Scalia’s defense of monopoly as 
an important element of the free enterprise system in Verizon 
 
Votes in Congress Cap Battle on Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/health/policy/26health.html; Jeff Zeleny & Robert 
Pear, Kucinich Switches Vote on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/kucinich-switches-vote-on-health-care/. 
 73. Cf. MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 32 (2003) (noting that the 
modern constitutional order that has supplanted the New Deal–Great Society order preserves 
baseline protections for some quality-of-life programs and the social safety net but cannot 
use the government to solve any new problems). 
 74. See Pitofsky, supra note 43, at 323–25. 
 75. The author heard Judge Ginsburg make this comment during his remarks at the 
Luncheon Roundtable Discussion with Federal Courts of Appeals Judges at the ABA Section 
of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting on Mar. 25, 2009. 
 76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY:  SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 12–13 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. 
 77. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on 
Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm. 
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Communications Inc., v. Trinko.78  Justice Scalia went out of his way to 
make that argument:  in the context of the decision, the discussion was 
dicta,79 and he could have made his economic point by talking about 
appropriability as a spur to innovation without seeming to welcome 
monopolies.  In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions seem to evidence 
an interest in chipping away at private antitrust enforcement;80 this is a 
possible theme connecting Trinko,81 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. 
Billing,82 Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly,83 and the Court’s acceptance of 
certiorari in Behrend v. Comcast Inc.84 
IV.  ANTITRUST FUTURES 
This perspective on the evolution of regulatory policy provides a window 
into possible futures for antitrust.  These speculations are just that:  sketches 
of ways that competition policy in the United States might evolve based on 
the framework set forth above, relying more on conjecture than evidence. 
One possibility is that the center/right coalition will fall apart, leading to 
regulatory gridlock.85  If so, antitrust enforcement policy and judicial rules 
might not change substantially, but the political jockeying to control the 
framework governing economic regulatory policy could turn competition 
matters that previously would have been treated as routine law enforcement 
 
 78.  540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that a nonantitrust statutory scheme providing for 
extensive regulation aimed at promoting competition in telephony displaced private 
enforcement under the Sherman Act). 
 79. The Court held that an antitrust claim could not proceed in a setting in which a 
separate statutory scheme provided for extensive regulation aimed at promoting competition.  
 80. DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 62–
63 (2011). 
 81. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (“Judicial oversight under the Sherman Act would . . . 
lead to a new layer of interminable litigation . . . .”) (holding that the plaintiff customer class 
failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act). 
 82. 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007) (highlighting the risk of inconsistent outcomes and 
“antitrust mistakes” if private antitrust plaintiffs bring lawsuits “in dozens of different courts 
with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries”).  Wariness about private 
antitrust enforcement also helps explain why a conservative Supreme Court would prefer 
regulation to antitrust in Trinko and Credit Suisse. 
 83. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that allegations must be plausible, not merely possible, 
to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
 84. 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 24 (Jun. 25, 2012) (No. 11-
864) (considering standards for certifying a plaintiff class on the facts of an antitrust case). 
 85. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, What It Will Take for Barack Obama To Become the Next FDR, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2012/11/what-it-will-take-for-barack-obama-to-become-the-next-fdr/264195/ (describing 
Obama as a “preemptive” President, swimming against a conservative tide).  The “median 
voter theorem” suggests that centrist views will tend to control in political institutions that 
operate by majority rule, MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 97 (2009).  But that model does not account for the 
role of ideologically-cohesive voting groups, or illustrate the possibility that bargaining 
among those groups would break down, leading to gridlock. 
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matters into subjects for political conflict.86  This already happens to a 
limited extent:  members of Congress occasionally take sides on high-
profile government antitrust investigations, and the firms involved 
occasionally seek to mobilize political support.87  With regulatory gridlock, 
political interest in enforcement decisions and judicial outcomes could 
become less exceptional. 
Some room would remain for antitrust enforcement priorities to shift 
without political change, through enforcement agency case selection.  
Suppose, for example, that recession, unemployment, and fiscal issues 
become less of a preoccupation for economic policy, as might happen with 
greater progress toward economic recovery and a resolution of the political 
debate over the federal budget, taxes, and the future solvency of entitlement 
programs.  Under such circumstances, concerns about long term economic 
growth may increase in salience, increasing the focus of competition 
enforcement on promoting innovation and growth notwithstanding a 
growing difficulty with formulating consistent regulatory policy 
generally.88 
Another possibility involves a decisive political realignment that would 
place one of the three ideological groups—conservatives, centrists, or 
progressives—in control of all three branches of government for a sustained 
period.  Then that group would be able to set regulatory policy on its own, 
without the need to form a coalition with any other group.  The policy 
specifics would depend on which group takes charge of economic 
regulatory policy.  A realignment that favors either conservatives or 
progressives would mark an end to the political bargain,89 while 
realignment in favor of centrists would likely reaffirm the existing political 
 
 86. For similar reasons, it would become increasingly difficult to build a political 
consensus in support of many agency rules implementing statutory mandates in the broader 
realm of economic regulation, from the environment to the internet, and any rules that are 
implemented may face routine court challenges and increasingly searching judicial review 
regardless of their content. 
 87. See, e.g., Brent Kendall et al., Behind Google’s Antitrust Escape, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
5, 2013, at B3; Kim Hart & Anna Palmer, AT&T’s T-Mobile Merger Lobbying Campaign 
Falls Short, POLITICO (Sept. 1, 2011, 9:19 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0911/62472.html.  
 88. On the connection between competition policy and economic growth, see Jonathan 
B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow:  How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 575, 579 (2007); Baker, supra note 17 (section III.B) (highlighting the particular threat 
anticompetitive exclusion poses to economic growth); Carl Shapiro, Competition and 
Innovation:  Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY REVISITED 361 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012). 
 89. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 483.  The losing side would likely mobilize 
politically to overturn its electoral defeat.  As a result, regulatory and antitrust policies may 
become politicized and unstable for decades, much as the nation experienced during the 
early twentieth century, leading to the loss of the efficiency gains that flowed from adopting 
a competition policy as the primary economic regulatory approach. 
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understanding.90  It is hard to say more about the consequences of a 
political realignment for antitrust or regulatory policy without speculating 
about the nature of the circumstances that precipitate thoroughgoing 
political change.91 
Putting aside the possibility of realignment, two other future outcomes 
could arise within the existing political framework if the centrists can find 
allies.  One possibility is that the conservatives and the centrists may restore 
their alliance.  If they do, they would need a new affirmative agenda, as 
deregulation has likely run its course.  Conservative concerns that 
regulation and regulatory uncertainty discourage investment and growth 
may offer a theme that would allow a restored center/right alliance to 
protect what it has achieved in three decades of deregulation, but this theme 
would be unlikely to lead to substantial changes in antitrust and regulatory 
policy.  Such an outcome would appear different from regulatory gridlock 
mainly in that competition policy issues would be less politicized in public 
debate. 
The final future possibility is that the center and left would find common 
ground, as they previously did in the middle of the twentieth century.  One 
plausible theme for such a coalition would be a concern with the power of 
large firms in concentrated markets—combining a concern with economic 
power, which may be the more important issue for centrists, and a concern 
with political power, which may be more important for the left.92  This 
theme could tie episodic political debates over the power of large banks, oil 
companies, and health insurers to the consequences of corporate political 
influence, in order to frame a broader political conversation.  A center/left 
coalition would maintain the political bargain.  Antitrust policy most likely 
would remain focused on economic goals but with the rules reformed to 
lessen the threat that firms would exercise market power.  Rules governing 
exclusionary conduct, and related procedural rules governing private 
 
 90. Specific regulatory and antitrust policies might drift away from the 
noninterventionist pole in the current U.S. debate, though, as those policies would no longer 
be shaped in part by conservatives. 
 91. For example, a sustained period of slow economic growth could lead an interest 
group to conclude that its share of the efficiency gains from acceding to the political bargain 
in favor of competition policy would no longer exceed the gains the group could obtain by 
mobilizing politically to capture government institutions and subvert the political bargain by 
altering regulatory policy to redistribute in its favor. 
 92. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST:  HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).  Similarly, some conservative commentators, particularly 
those writing in the public choice tradition, are concerned about the dangers of “crony 
capitalism.” See, e.g., LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE:  RECAPTURING THE 
LOST GENIUS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY (2012).  For Zingales, “the most powerful argument 
in favor of antitrust law” is that it “reduces the political power of firms.” Id. at 38. 
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litigation, might change the most, as the norms governing exclusion are 
likely the most contested today.93 
Although an opportunistic center/left coalition enacted health care reform 
and adopted new financial legislation during President Obama’s first term, 
it is hard to imagine a more consistent center/left alliance gaining control of 
economic regulatory policy so long as conservatives dominate the House of 
Representatives and the Supreme Court.94  For that reason, a successful 
center/left coalition may be predicated on an electoral shift,95 albeit one 
short of a broad political realignment, and the replacement of a conservative 
Justice by a more liberal one. 
Politics, like life itself, has a way of bringing surprises.  Competition law 
and economic regulatory policy may not develop along any of the lines 
sketched above.  Still, this exercise suggests that regulatory policy—
antitrust included—is unlikely to change substantially unless and until 
outside events or demographic shifts lead to significant political change. 
V.  ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN ANTITRUST:  A CONCLUDING COMMENT 
The modifications to antitrust rules during the 1980s followed, to a 
substantial extent, the recommendations of Judges Bork and Posner, who 
were heavily influenced by Chicago school economics.96  More recent 
antitrust enforcement and policy initiatives have incorporated later 
developments in economics.97  Here I have in mind, for example, the 
acceptance of unilateral effects analysis in merger review;98 the game-
theoretic elaboration of the Stiglerian deterrence model of coordination and 
its application to the problems of inferring agreement from circumstantial 
evidence99 and evaluating coordinated effects of mergers;100 the application 
 
 93. See generally Baker, supra note 88.  Outside of the antitrust world, a center/left 
regulatory policy might also reduce the scope of intellectual property rights. 
 94. See, e.g., Polarization Is Real (and Aysmmetric), VOTEVIEW (May 16, 2012), 
http://voteview.com/blog/?p=494 (analyzing congressional polarization). 
 95. Cf. Balkin, supra note 85 (“[I]t will probably take a third Democratic presidency to 
finally end the age of Reagan.”). 
 96. See generally BORK, supra note 4; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1st ed. 
1976). 
 97. I provided a prospective sketch of some of these ideas in Jonathan B. Baker, Recent 
Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 
(1989).  When the notes to the next sentences cite my survey articles, the point is to avoid 
extensive literature reviews in the margin, not to downplay the contributions of others. 
 98. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 6. See generally Jonathan B. 
Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects?, 12 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 31 (2003). 
 99. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas:  Parallel 
Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 
143 (1993); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343 
(2011). 
 100. See, for example, the increased focus on the role of mavericks in merger analysis. 
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 2.1.5; see also Jonathan B. Baker, 
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of the “raising rivals’ costs” framework and the recent economic literature 
on foreclosure to evaluating exclusionary conduct;101 the application of 
modern economic learning on “two-sided” platforms in markets with 
network effects to evaluating firm conduct;102 and the increased application 
of econometrics103 and merger simulation104 in antitrust enforcement and 
litigation. 
As this sketch of developments suggests, economics plays an 
overwhelming role in shaping antitrust thinking and analysis today.  For 
that reason, it is not surprising that some commentators describe modern 
antitrust as largely a technocratic activity based on economic analysis.105  
Yet, as indicated above, it is impossible to view the evolution of antitrust 
without seeing politics as well as economics.  My vision of antitrust’s goals 
and future recognizes the political context of antitrust while simultaneously 
embracing the central role of economics in the field.  So long as 
competition policy remains the product of a political understanding aimed 
at capturing economic efficiencies, as it should, economic analysis will 
remain the essence of antitrust policy, enforcement, and litigation. 
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